

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 7, 2008

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: W. Linzau and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending November 7, 2008

Staff members J. Troan and B. Heshmatpour observed the quarterly meeting of the Office of Environmental Management High-level Waste Corporate Board.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): The contractor declared a Potential Inadequacy of the Safety Analysis when it was determined that the requirements in the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) were not incorporated in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The FHA credited both a confinement berm around the hydraulic plant used for an elevator and the cooling effect of sprinklers for preventing a hydraulic oil fire from causing the collapse of the roof of the facility. Although the DSA and TSR credit the safety-class berm for mitigating this hydraulic fire, it did not credit the fire sprinklers. Compensatory measures were instituted to restrict the use of the elevator when the fire suppression system is not operable.

The contractor completed the isolation of the first glovebox in the main PFP facility from the filtered exhaust system. This is in preparation for removing this glovebox later this month.

Tank Farms: The Office of River Protection (ORP) completed an assessment of the AW Tank Farm safety-significant ventilation system. This detailed ORP review of the system was the first since it was recently upgraded (see Activity Report 9/19/2008). The assessment team identified four findings and three observations at the outbrief. Most of the issues involve the new digital control system. One finding dealt with the failure to remove unanchored scaffolding used for testing before declaring the system operational.

The contractor initiated a requirement to have approval from a Hazard Review Board for work involving cranes prior to work release. This is a compensatory action for a preliminary finding of a root cause investigation (see Activity Report 10/10/08) that questions the training and proficiency of crane operators who are provided by the site infrastructure support contractor. The site rep shared this information with the Plateau Remediation Contractor, and it is taking actions to ensure that its work involving site-supplied cranes does not have similar problems.

Solid Waste Storage and Disposal Project: The contractor discovered that the rated capacity of a lifting device was exceeded during a critical lift of a large box during retrieval activities. This failure to meet requirements of the Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual is a noncompliance with a TSR administrative control. The weight of the box exceeded the capacity of the lifting fixture on the tines of the forklift by about 500 pounds because the historic records significantly under-predicted the weight of the box. During a subsequent lift of the same box using a crane, the actual weight was determined because a dynamometer could be used. The lift occurred in August 2008 and was recently discovered when a project engineer noticed the discrepancy during reviews of the paperwork for another task. The engineer's discovery and reporting of the error demonstrated a good questioning attitude and was commended by contractor management.